Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court of Canada by McCormick, Peter
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 51, Issue 2 (Winter 2014) Article 6
Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment
on the Supreme Court of Canada
Peter McCormick
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Article
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
McCormick, Peter. "Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court of Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal
51.2 (2014) : 595-626.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol51/iss2/6
Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court
of Canada
Abstract
This article poses the question: Now that women are receiving an increasing share of the seats on the Supreme
Court of Canada (the Court), can we conclude with confidence that they have been admitted to full
participation, with a mix of judgments—including the more significant decisions—that is fully comparable to
their male colleagues? The author looks at the assignment of reasons for judgment on the Court over the last
three chief justiceships, with specific reference to the relative rate of assignments to male and female judges.
He finds that the male/female gap is more robust than ever, although he also identifies considerations that
suggest that there may be factors other than gender alone that are at play.
Keywords
Judicial process; Women judges; Canada. Supreme Court; Canada
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol51/iss2/6
595
Who Writes?       
Gender and Judgment Assignment on 
the Supreme Court of Canada
PETER MCCORMICK *
* Peter McCormick is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Lethbridge.
This article poses the question: Now that women are receiving an increasing share of the 
seats on the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court), can we conclude with confidence that 
they have been admitted to full participation, with a mix of judgments—including the more 
significant decisions—that is fully comparable to their male colleagues? The author looks at 
the assignment of reasons for judgment on the Court over the last three chief justiceships, 
with specific reference to the relative rate of assignments to male and female judges. He 
finds that the male/female gap is more robust than ever, although he also identifies consid-
erations that suggest that there may be factors other than gender alone that are at play.
Cet article soulève la question suivante : alors que les femmes représentent aujourd’hui 
une proportion de plus en plus grande des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada, est-il 
possible d’affirmer, en analysant une brochette de jugements – dont ceux qui ont été les plus 
marquants – qu’elles sont désormais sur un pied d’égalité avec leurs collègues masculins? 
L’auteur examine les motifs assignés des jugements de la Cour sous ses trois derniers juges 
en chef, en étudiant plus particulièrement la proportion des assignations confiées aux juges 
masculins et féminins. Il constate que l’écart entre les hommes et les femmes est plus 
tenace que jamais auparavant, bien qu’il identifie également des éléments qui suggèrent 
que des facteurs autres que le sexe pourraient entrer en ligne de compte.
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I. INTRODUCTION
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE Supreme Court of Canada (the Court)? The Court exerts 
its influence—its power, if you will—through the words that explain and ground 
its decisions that send signals to the lower courts and link the immediate case to 
previous cases. But who writes those words? Five judges on the full court (or four 
on a seven-judge panel, or three on the increasingly rare five-judge panels) can 
decide the outcome of an appeal. However, except for a modest but persisting 
number of the anonymous unanimous “By the Court” judgments, the writing 
of the reasons for judgment is normally1 attributed to a single judge. Although 
the outcome of the immediate case may not be of major interest to any save the 
immediate parties, the reasons provided for that outcome constitute the precedent 
that guides the lower courts, sending signals that encourage or discourage 
potential litigants. While the circulate-and-revise process adds a collegial element 
to this nominally solo effort, it is reasonable to assume that it makes a difference 
who does the writing. It is also reasonable to think that justices accept service 
on the Court with the thought that they will be doing some of that writing. For 
at least some of the caseload—the “plums” as distinct from the “lemons,” to use 
1. As my careful wording suggests, “normally” denies “always,” and co-authored decisions—
reasons attributed equally to two judges, or even more rarely three judges—have become 
rather more frequent in the last decade and a half. See Peter J McCormick, “Sharing the 
Spotlight: Co-authored Reasons on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 34:1 Dal 
LJ 165. I will discuss this development and how it bears on judgment delivery in Part IV(A), 
below.
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the language of American academic discussions of opinion-assignment practices 
at the United States Supreme Court (the USSC)2—the writing of majority 
reasons is something actively desired, not grudgingly accepted, and its allocation 
therefore demands study.
The modern assumption seems to be that all the judges on the Court should 
share—perhaps roughly equally—the writing of judgments, although, as Gerard 
Magliocca points out, this was not always the case for the USSC, and it is not 
clear when that expectation emerged.3 It is even less clear when and to what 
extent that expectation has come to be shared in Canada.4 
This raises the empirical question of the extent to which judgment delivery 
is in fact shared on the Court, and derivatively, of which judges or groups of 
judges, if any, might be advantaged or disadvantaged by the distribution of the 
opportunities to write judgments.
Donald Songer recently suggested that female judges have been consistently 
disadvantaged, receiving fewer judgment assignments than their male colleagues, 
a tendency that surprisingly persists even now that the Chief Justice—who plays 
a significant but apparently not a pre-emptively strong role in the assignment 
of judgments—is a woman.5 His assertion raises an important question about 
2. David Danelski is the iconic reference on this subject. See David J Danelski, “Assignment of 
the Court’s Opinion by the Chief Justice” (Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, April 1960), [unpublished]. A later version 
of the same ideas can be found in David J Danelski “The Influence of the Chief Justice in 
the Decisional Process” in Walter F Murphy & C Herman Pritchett, eds, Courts, Judges, and 
Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process (New York: Random House, 1961) 497. 
3. Magliocca says “I’m not sure when the Supreme Court started distributing its opinion 
assignments evenly,” but he answers his own question by saying that “[t]here was evidently 
a sea change in the Court’s customs in the middle of the 20th century.” See “Supreme 
Court Opinion Days” (21 June 2012), online: Concurring Opinions <http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/supreme-court-hand-down-days.html>. 
4. See Peter J McCormick, “Share and Share Alike? Or Winner Take Most?: Judgment 
Assignment on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (Paper delivered at the Midwest 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 11 April 2013), 
[unpublished]. There I examine the allocation of reasons for judgment, concluding that there 
is a reasonably strong practice of sharing for at least the four most recent chief justiceships.
5. Comments by Donald Songer at session 45-12 of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, on 13 April 2012. It was my impression at the time that he was speaking 
about conclusions that were included in his recently published book, but the relevant chapter 
contains no such discussion. See Donald R Songer et al, Law, Ideology and Collegiality: 
Judicial Behavior in the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 
2012) [Songer, Law, Ideology and Collegiality]. John Szmer, Robert Christensen and Susan W 
Johnson offer a similarly tantalizing (one-line) conclusion about female judges and judgment 
delivery. “Supreme Court of Canada Majority Opinion Assignment” (Paper delivered at the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Session 45-12, Chicago, Illinois, 13 April 2012), 16 
[unpublished]. 
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the participation of women in major social institutions from which they were 
until recently excluded. It is not a small thing for women to begin to share the 
membership of such institutions, nor is it a small thing for their share to rise 
towards equal numbers; but the critical question is the extent to which that 
representation involves full and equal participation in that institution, including 
its most important as well as its more routine activities. The ghost at the banquet 
is token representation: a place at the table, but less than a full role in what 
the people are at the table to accomplish. The implication is that the growing 
presence of women in our society’s professions and major institutions may still be 
coloured by differential treatment and variable expectations, by invisible but real 
barriers of the sort often described as “glass ceilings.” Songer’s comment suggests 
that something of the sort may be true of the Court.
This article will treat Songer’s assertion as its central hypothesis, and test it 
against empirical data. The hypothesis is that women have played a smaller part in 
the important activities of the Court than their share of the Court’s membership 
would have led us to expect. One of those activities is the assignment and delivery 
of judgments (i.e., majority reasons) of the Court, especially in more important 
cases. Testing this hypothesis presents some challenges in terms of what to count 
and how to count it. I will first deal with these methodological questions in order 
to examine, in turn, the three chief justiceships (Chief Justices Dickson, Lamer, 
and McLachlin), for which women have made up a meaningful component of 
the Court’s membership.6 I will draw conclusions from the full period of the three 
chief justiceships as to whether or not female judges have become full partici-
pants. Essentially, my findings will corroborate Songer’s hypothesis, particularly 
in the case of the more important decisions (a narrowing of focus not addressed 
by Songer). I will also explore an additional factor that needs to be considered 
in order to reach the appropriate and precise description of the status of female 
judges on the Court: I call it the “Chief Justice factor.” 
II. ASSIGNING THE JUDGMENT
I start this Part with a brief summary of the current literature on the judgment 
assignment process of the Court. I draw upon the very parallel accounts provided 
6. It would not be useful to extend the analysis to the Laskin Court; although Justice Wilson 
became the first female to serve on the Court while Chief Justice Laskin was still Chief 
Justice, she served for only the last three and a half months of his decade plus as Chief 
Justice.
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by Ian Greene,7 Songer,8 Cynthia L. Ostberg and Matthew Wetstein,9 as well as 
Justice Bertha Wilson’s comments more than twenty years ago.10
After oral arguments, the judges meet in conference for a brief sharing 
of views during which a majority sense, a “feeling of the mood of the Court,” 
emerges, and usually one of the justices will volunteer to take on the responsi-
bility of being the lead author for a set of majority reasons that will go through 
a process of circulation, comment, revision, and recirculation. If more than one 
justice volunteers, the more senior justice prevails. There is no suggestion that 
someone—amongst the other justices in the majority or the Chief Justice—
resolves this by reference to a broader sense of which judge best reflects the 
“mood of the Court.” Nor do I see any explicit mention of an expectation of 
equal sharing, although as I have concluded elsewhere, there does seem to have 
been such an ethic in play for some time.11 Absent a volunteer, the Chief Justice 
will suggest that a specific justice might volunteer. If that person demurs, the 
Chief Justice will assign the judgment.
This description presents a fascinating mixture of the collegial and the hierar-
chical, a splendid operational counterpart to the effectively self-negating “first 
among equals” that we typically use to describe the chief justiceship itself, but 
with its own additional wrinkle. On the one hand, individual judges volunteer, 
either as part of the cycle of discussion at conference or immediately at the end of 
conference once consensus has emerged or the divisions have revealed themselves. 
In the event that multiple judges volunteer, the tie is broken in favor of seniority, 
with the Chief Justice automatically being the most senior, and the others ranked 
by the date of their appointment. On the other hand, should this not happen, the 
Chief Justice asks a specific justice if he or she will volunteer. If the judge refuses 
to volunteer, the Chief Justice assigns the judgment.
Apparently (I find no indication to the contrary), the Chief Justice’s role is 
not affected by whether or not he or she voted with the majority.12 My assumption 
is that where the Chief Justice does not serve on a particular panel, his or her role 
7. Ian Greene et al, Final appeal: decision-making in Canadian courts of appeal (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Company Ltd, 1998).
8. The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008) [Songer, Transformation]; Songer, Law, ideology and 
collegiality, supra note 5. 
9. Attitudinal decision making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
10. “Decision making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36:3 UTLJ 227.
11. See supra note 4. 
12. This is not a small matter—Chief Justices may be less likely to be writing or joining minority 
reasons than many of the other justices on the Court, but they still do more than 10 per cent 
of the time, a consideration that looms larger if we assume that the more important cases are 
more likely to elicit disagreement. 
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is played by the most senior justice. At the end of the day, through a process 
more spontaneous than steered, the assignment of judgments should lead to a fair 
sharing of the work and a reasonable partition of the opportunities to influence 
the development of judicial doctrine. The contrast with the relatively straightfor-
ward “assigned by the senior justice within the majority” of the USSC13 is striking. 
One of the implications of the Canadian model is that we cannot clearly attribute 
responsibility for whatever we might find, good or bad, in the judgment delivery 
patterns. Another implication is that we cannot suggest how, or by whom, any 
problem (should one be detected) might be fixed.
I cannot find any real discussion in the literature about the patterns that result 
from these judgment assignment practices except for Songer’s passing comments 
relating to seniority,14 and my own earlier (and now very dated) musings.15 I 
would, therefore, like to explore this question, focussing on the relative participa-
tion rates of various judges, especially the female judges. As I suggested earlier in 
this Part, I cannot draw any conclusions as to the relative impact on these patterns 
of the various factors involved: simple diffidence; being out-ranked in terms of 
seniority (or in the case of “swing” judgments16 simply being “out-persuaded”); 
or of Chief Justice leadership, either heavy-handed or subtle.
III. DESCRIBING THE APPROACH
My primary data are simply the number of judgments delivered by each of 
the members of the Court during each of the three chief justiceships. I have 
drawn this information from a database for all Court decisions since 1949.17 
While some judges—by definition the Chief Justice himself or herself, but 
usually one or more other judges as well—have served for the entire period of 
13. See e.g. Forrest Maltzmann & Paul J Wahlbeck, “A Conditional Model of Opinion 
Assignment on the Supreme Court” (2004) 57:4 Pol Research Q 551. The article begins with 
the statement: “The chief justice’s power to assign the majority opinion on the U.S. Supreme 
Court provides an indispensable agenda-setting tool for the chief.”
14. Songer, Transformation, supra note 8 at 126-31.
15. Peter McCormick, “Judicial Career Patterns and the Delivery of Reasons for Judgment in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1993” (1994) 5 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 499. 
16. “Swing judgments” are those for which the initial assignee of the majority reasons has lost 
the majority and wound up writing minority reasons.  See Peter J McCormick, “‘Was 
it Something I Said?’: Losing the Majority on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 
1984-2011” (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 93.
17. The Manitoba Legal Research Institute and the Alberta Law Foundation funded the initial 
work on this database. I am grateful to Professor Alvin Esau of the University of Manitoba, 
who strongly encouraged me to undertake this data collection project and commented 
helpfully on the initial design.
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each Chief Justice, the membership of the Court undergoes a constant process 
of replacement and renewal. The Dickson Court saw six new appointments 
(including the replacement for the previous Chief Justice); the Lamer Court 
likewise six; and the McLachlin Court, at time of writing, has seen no fewer 
than ten. The simple count of reasons for judgment, then, can only be a basis for 
reasonable comparison if it is crossed back against the years of service to generate 
a “judgments per year” count for each member of the Court.
But this already points to the need for a first refinement of the data: This 
count is misleading because the Court caseload continues to include a non-trivial 
number of oral, from-the-bench, decisions (i.e., cases that are not reserved for 
judgment but are decided on the day of hearing). These are typically appeals by 
right, usually heard by minimum five-judge panels, and normally dismissed by 
reasons of a single paragraph (sometimes a single sentence) in length, and almost 
always delivered by the most senior member of the panel.18 These numbers can 
be considerable. For example, during the Lamer Court decade they made up 
about 30 per cent of the total caseload. Today they still make up a more modest 
one-ninth of the caseload of the McLachlin Court—but if the focus of this 
investigation is to be on the more substantive, researched reasons for judgment 
that may have an effect as precedent on future cases, then the inclusion of 
from-the-bench decisions will distort the results. I have, therefore, excluded them 
from consideration; my count is of the authorships of reasons for judgment on 
reserved decisions.
A second refinement is that, for the purposes of analysis, I have divided the 
chief justiceships not in terms of the date on which judgments were delivered, but 
rather the dates on which oral arguments were heard. This division has a double 
utility. First, it means that new judges are not waiting for a year or so as “old” 
decisions finish their cycle through the draft-and-circulate phase before their own 
panel participation begins to generate substantive decisions. Using the obvious 
decision delivery date would underestimate the participation of new judges by 
misleadingly inflating their length of service. Second, it means that judgments 
delivered by Chief Justices after their retirement (during the six months that 
the Supreme Court Act19 allows them to wind up their reserved decision partici-
pation) are assigned to their chief justiceship, not the new one. For example, 
given that Chief Justice Dickson’s judgment in R v Keegstra20 was not delivered 
until the middle of December 1990, five and a half months after his retirement, 
18. The presentation of such reasons is so pro forma that sometimes the senior justice delivers 
reasons that announce the outcome while reporting his or her own dissent from the decision.
19. RSC 1985, c S-26.
20. [1990] 3 SCR 697, 124 DLR (4th) 289.
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using decision delivery date rather than oral argument date would mean that the 
single most frequently cited decision of the Lamer Court had been delivered by 
Chief Justice Dickson, which is to say, by a judge who was not in any serious 
sense a member of the Lamer Court. Similarly, Chief Justice Lamer’s decision 
in R v Proulx,21 handed down almost a month after Justice McLachlin became 
Chief Justice, would have placed in the top ten most frequently cited decisions 
of the McLachlin Court. This is only the most dramatic demonstration of the 
fact that for the first few months after the appointment of a new Chief Justice, 
the decisions delivered on reserved judgments are necessarily the product of the 
decision assignment dynamics of the previous chief justiceship. Any change in 
those dynamics can emerge only with the judgment assignments that occur on 
the new Chief Justice’s watch.
A third refinement of the data recognizes that not all Court decisions are 
equally important. Granted, all are important enough that the litigant thought 
it worth the bother, the expense, and the investment of time to bring the matter 
before the highest court. Granted as well, it is usually the case that the Court also 
indicated a presumption of a certain level of importance by granting leave to appeal 
(a hurdle that most such applications do not manage to clear). However, some 
cases raise much more major issues, and some do (while others do not) resolve 
issues in such a powerful and persuasive way as to impact the Court’s decisions 
for some time. My mechanism for distinguishing the more important from the 
less important cases is to let the Court do the selecting for me: I will take it that 
the more important cases are the ones that are cited more often in subsequent 
decisions of the Court itself. “Important enough to cite” is the relevant hurdle, 
and how often a specific decision clears that hurdle is an objective indicator that 
can be used to rank the decisions. The numbers here derive from a database of all 
citations to judicial authority in Court decisions since 1970, including citations 
in minority reasons as well as in judgments of the Court.22
Why are some cases cited while others are not? The most obvious factor is 
the enduring importance of the issue (or issues) that the case in question resolves, 
and the most obvious example makes the point: R v Oakes.23 This Dickson Court 
decision that set the test for applying the “reasonable limits” clause of section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms24 is as far as I can determine the most 
frequently cited Court decision of all time, its utility deriving from the frequency 
with which section 1 arguments figure as an element within a Charter case. 
21. 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 SCR 61.
22. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council funded the initial work on this 
database, and I am grateful to them for their support.
23. [1986] 1 SCR 103, 24 CCC (3d) 321.
24. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Charter].
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A second factor would be how solidly and effectively the decision in question 
resolves the issue, and how well it continues to satisfy the expectations and the 
needs of the judges who deal with variations of the central issue over time. A third 
factor would be the reputation of the judge in question (as Richard A. Posner 
has pointed out,25 citation is simultaneously a measure, and a possible source, of 
prestige). A final factor would simply be the luck of the draw: An issue may prove 
to have more lasting salience, and a solid decision on the matter may therefore 
prove to have “longer legs,” than might have been anticipated when the decision 
was handed down. Since some mixture of immediate salience, merit, expertise, 
reputation, and luck combines to generate the numbers, the frequency of citation 
certainly cannot be treated as a function of merit simpliciter, and I hazard no 
guess as to how much each factor matters. 
To be sure, frequency of citation is not a perfect indicator of importance. 
There are cases that are clearly important, but in such a way that they do not 
trigger subsequent citation to any unusual extent; an example might be the 
Reference re Secession of Quebec,26 which is well down the citation frequency list 
for the Lamer Court despite its unquestionable importance on a number of 
dimensions. On the other hand, there are certain recurring issues (e.g., standards 
of review and rules of statutory interpretation) that are very important to the 
Court, such that problem-resolving decisions on these matters (e.g., Rizzo & 
Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re)27 and Housen v Nikolaisen28) draw a steady string of citations, 
even though they would not loom large in the eyes of many commentators and 
might go unrecognized by any broader public. Even so, I think citation frequency 
is a reasonable surrogate for at least one major dimension of the importance 
of judicial decisions, and I will use it for each of the three chief justiceships 
in turn. Specifically, for each chief justiceship I will generate numbers first for 
the overall distribution of reserved judgments, and then for a “top tenth” of the 
Court’s decisions. I define the top tenth as the 10 per cent of reserved judgments 
receiving the highest number of subsequent citations by the Court itself.
For two reasons this methodology requires a division into chief justiceships, 
rather than treating the “women on the Supreme Court” period as a single block 
of data. First, the caseload of the Court—and more specifically the caseload of 
decisions reserved for judgment—has been sliding gradually downward even 
while panel sizes have been sliding upward. “Average reserved judgments per judge 
per year” is, therefore, a moving target, lower for the Lamer Court than for the 
25. Cardozo: a study in reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
26. [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession Reference].
27. [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154 DLR (4th) 193.
28. 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235.
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Dickson Court, and lower again for the McLachlin Court. The squeeze applies 
to, and is even more significant for, the top tenth decisions; as we move through 
the three Courts, there are progressively fewer of these to go around. Second, the 
accumulation of citations by any judgment, once it has been delivered, is largely 
a function of time, the differential impact of which is better contained by treating 
each chief justiceship as a separate block (although the citation accumulation 
of McLachlin Court decisions presents a special challenge that I will deal with 
below, in Part IV(C)). Ultimately, my concern is to track the evolution of these 
patterns rather than to treat them as a single flat aggregate, and the division into 
chief justiceships better serves this temporal dimension.
IV. THE THREE COURTS
A. THE DICKSON COURT
Chief Justice Dickson served on the Court in that capacity for just over six years, 
from April 1984 to July 1990. Table 1 briefly summarizes the service of the fifteen 
judges who served for all or part of his chief justiceship. 













Lamer 6.20 66.33 10.6 11.33 1.83 208%
Dickson CJ 6.20 56.83 9.3 10.83 1.75 199%
McLachlin 1.25 20 16.0 2 1.60 181%
La Forest 5.45 49.5 9.1 8.5 1.56 178%
Wilson 6.20 54.33 8.7 5.33 0.86 98%
Gonthier 1.40 16 11.4 1 0.71 81%
Le Dain 4.51 27 6.0 3 0.67 76%
McIntyre 4.83 43 8.9 3 0.62 71%
Sopinka 2.10 29 13.8 1 0.48 54%
Estey 4.01 15 3.7 1 0.25 28%
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Beetz 4.56 22 4.8 1 0.22 25%
L’Heureux-Dubé 3.21 18 5.6 0 0
Chouinard 2.80 16 5.7 0 0
Cory 1.41 22 15.6 0 0
Ritchie 0.54 0 0 0 0
By the Court 51 2
The fractions of a judgment might seem curious, but they reflect a 
judgment-delivery practice that was most unusual on the Dickson Court, but 
emerged more strongly in the middle of the Lamer decade and has continued 
to increase since that time.29 That practice is the co-authorship of reasons, with 
two (much more rarely three) judges jointly indicated as lead authors of a set 
of reasons. During the Dickson Court, Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La 
Forest co-authored the judgment in R v Sparrow,30 while Chief Justice Dickson, 
Justice Lamer, and Justice Wilson jointly authored the reasons in Irwin Toy Ltd 
v Québec (Attorney General).31 The only reasonable way to present the results of 
this practice is through the fractional sharing of the reasons, which is what I have 
done in Table 1.
Leaving out the fifty-one By the Court judgments, the overall average was 
8.3 decisions per judge per year. Among the female judges, Justice Wilson was 
slightly above this, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) on rather short length 
of service doubled it, and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was well below. The very low 
numbers for Justice Estey reflect the fact that for a full term (1985–86) he was 
seconded from the Court to conduct an inquiry into the failure of two western 
Canadian banks; and the low numbers for Justice Beetz are presumably the result 
of the health concerns that led him to leave the Court well before the mandatory 
retirement age.
The real question with respect to the sharing of judgments relates to the 
allocation of the more important decisions, which I have chosen to operationalize 
in terms of the frequency of subsequent citation: The most important decisions 
for present purposes are those that are cited more often by the Court itself in 
29. See supra note 1. 
30. [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385.
31. [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy].
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subsequent years. Since the Dickson Court heard oral argument and reserved 
for judgment a total of 506 cases, my top tenth isolates the fifty most frequently 
cited decisions.32 For the counts below, two of these drop out because they were 
By the Court decisions whose authorship was not attributed to any specific judge 
or judges on the panel. For purposes of illustration, Table 2 lists the top dozen 
cases, all of which have been cited ninety times or more. 
TABLE 2: MOST FREQUENTLY CITED DECISIONS OF THE DICKSON COURT
Case Citation Delivered by Times Cited
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 Dickson CJ 240
R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 Lamer 138
Irwin Toy Ltd v Québec [1989] 1 SCR 927 Dickson CJ, Lamer & Wilson 136
Re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486 Lamer 135
R v Edwards Books and 
Art Ltd
[1986] 2 SCR 713 Dickson CJ 114
Mills v The Queen [1986] 1 SCR 863 McIntyre 105
Slaight Communications 
Inc v Davidson
[1989] 1 SCR 1038 Dickson CJ 101
Law Society British 
Columbia v Andrews
[1989] 1 SCR 143 Wilson 93
Reference Re Public 
Service Employee 
Relations Act (Alberta)
[1987] 1 SCR 313 Le Dain
92
R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309 La Forest 91
R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 Dickson CJ 91
Thomson Newspapers Ltd 
v Canada
[1990] 1 SCR 425 La Forest 90
Recalculating judgment participation on this smaller set of fifty cases 
generates the right-hand columns in Table 1. The implication of choosing the 
top tenth is that the overall ratio of all cases to important cases is ten to one, 
but this expectation does not predict the ratios for very many of the individual 
justices. (Interestingly, the three judges for whom this ratio does hold—Justices 
McLachlin, Wilson, and Le Dain—include two of the three female judges on 
the Dickson Court.) The “Top Tenth Per Year” column is the one that drives the 
ordering of names in Table 1, and is therefore implicitly some sort of “league 
32. My top tenth does not isolate the top fifty-one because there was a six-way tie for fifty-first. 
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table” for the Court’s sharing of the delivery of important decisions, prorated 
against length of service. For simplicity of comparison, and especially to facilitate 
comparisons between the chief justiceships, the final column expresses “Top 
Tenth Per Year” as a percentage of the all-judge average figure. 
Table 1 strongly suggests that the Dickson Court’s most important jurispru-
dence was dominated by the Dickson-Lamer-La Forest trio, who, between them, 
delivered thirty of the fifty most frequently cited decisions. They are joined in 
some sense by Justice McLachlin (as she then was), although this is based on a 
much shorter period of service. After this set of judges, there is a sharp drop-off 
in the frequency of significant judgment delivery, so much so that this split can 
be taken as a major dynamic within the decision delivery process for the Dickson 
Court. 
Table 1 also permits the accumulation of judgment delivery data for male 
and female judges as a group, and Table 3 presents these data.
 












All judges 54.68 455 8.32 48 0.88
Male judges 44.02 363 8.25 40.67 0.92
Female judges 10.66 92 8.63[104.7%] 7.33
0.69
[74.4%]
Overall, female judges delivered slightly more than their notional share of 
the total judgments of the Court: about 5 per cent per judge per year higher than 
that of their male colleagues. There are two ways to think about this apparent 
over-share. The first is simple proportionate increase: More decisions per year 
means more opportunities to deliver more of the important decisions per year, 
just as buying more tickets means a better chance of winning the lottery. The 
other is off-setting compensation—sharing the workload by giving one set of 
people a larger number of smaller cases, and the other a smaller set of larger cases. 
The latter is what seems to have happened. An over-share for female judges of 
5 per cent on all judgments accompanied a 25 per cent under-share of the top 
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tenth of frequently cited decisions. This was already signalled by the fact that the 
top dozen cases listed in Table 2 include decisions written by only one female 
judge, Justice Wilson: one judgment of her own (Andrews v Law Society of British 
Columbia33), and one shared with Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Lamer (as 
he then was) (Irwin Toy) in a then unusual co-authorship. As a group, men 
accumulated four times as many years of service as women, but they delivered 
more than eight times as many of the top dozen cases, and more than five times 
as many of the top tenth.
Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that female judges were more 
likely than their male counterparts to write or to join minority reasons (either 
dissents or separate concurrences, both of which were becoming more frequent 
for the Dickson Court than they had been for the preceding Laskin Court), an 
action that obviously means that they cannot be writing the majority judgment. 
Women wrote or joined minority reasons in just over 25 per cent of all their 
panel appearances, compared with 15 per cent for the men. Interestingly, this 
did not have the effect one might have anticipated on the writing of judgments 
overall. Years ago, Elliot E. Slotnick suggested that judges who frequently write 
minority judgments often pay a double penalty for their waywardness.34 First, 
they are less often within the majority for the assignment of majority reasons; 
and second, even when they are within the majority, they receive somewhat less 
than their notional share as an apparent implicit outsider tax. At least for the 
overall judgment numbers, precisely the opposite seems to have been the case 
on the Dickson Court: Women receive a more than off-balancing share of the 
assignments on those occasions when they are part of the majority, so that one 
would not guess from those numbers alone that disagreeing with the majority 
was a moderately disproportionate feature of their panel participation. But this 
offsetting appearance vanishes for the top tenth of decisions. Not only does the 
appearance of a policy of offsetting assignments vanish, but also the difference in 
the rate of important judgment delivery is almost exactly double the difference in 
panel-majority voting participation. On this more focused sample, perhaps there 
is something to the Slotnick thesis after all.
The Dickson Court was the first chief justiceship in our history that included 
several female judges who contributed significantly to the Court’s reasons for 
judgment. Yet it is demonstrably the case that overall, these female judges were 
less likely than their male counterparts to deliver the more important (i.e., more 
33. [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1.
34. “Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger” (1979) 23:1 
Am J Pol Sci 60 at 63.
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frequently cited) judgments of the Court. On a per judge per year basis, female 
judges were only 73 per cent as likely as male judges to deliver those significant 
decisions, and the list of the top twelve cases in Table 2 suggests that this factor 
applied even more strongly at the upper levels of that significance.  
B. THE LAMER COURT
Antonio Lamer became Chief Justice in July 1990 and his chief justiceship 
coincided almost perfectly with the decade of the 1990s. As with the Dickson 
Court, there was a steady rate of turnover. Table 4 provides judgment delivery 
information for the fourteen judges of the Lamer Court, paralleling the 
information in Table 1 above.













Arbour 0.31 6 19.4 1 3.23 402%
Iacobucci 8.52 82.33 9.7 11 1.29 161%
Lamer CJ 9.52 80.5 8.5 12 1.26 157%
La Forest 7.25 48 6.6 9 1.24 155%
Bastarache 2.27 17.33 7.6 2.5 1.10 137%
Cory 8.92 102.33 11.5 9.5 1.07 133%
Sopinka 7.40 68 10.5 7 0.95 118%
McLachlin 9.52 76.5 8.0 8 0.84 105%
L’Heureux-Dubé 9.52 44 4.6 5 0.53 65%
Major 7.15 45 6.3 1 0.14 17%
Gonthier 9.52 49 5.2 1 0.11 13%
Binnie 1.43 15 10.5 0 0
Wilson 0.51 2 3.9 0 0
Stevenson 1.63 9 5.5 0 0
By the Court 22 1
While the Dickson Court delivered only two co-authored decisions, the 
Lamer Court gave twenty-nine (twenty-eight double-authored, and one triple-
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authored), hence the fractions (halves and thirds) in the count of decisions 
delivered. The average number of decisions per judge per year (omitting the 
twenty-two By the Court decisions) for all judges is 7.85, down about half a 
decision per year from the Dickson Court. Although the total caseload of the 
Lamer Court is higher than that of the Dickson Court, the larger number of 
from-the-bench decisions means that the reserved caseload has actually gone 
down. 
Again, a female judge (this time Justice Arbour) stands near the top of Table 
4 (in fact, she tops it), but this is based on less than half a year of service. A female 
judge (Justice Wilson) is also found near the bottom of the table, with similarly 
short service at the end of her career on the bench.
As with the Dickson Court, I have used citation counts to identify the most 
important of the Lamer Court decisions; since there were 677 cases reserved for 
judgment during the Lamer decade, the top 10 per cent of the decisions include 
the sixty-eight most frequently cited decisions, and the cut-off was twenty-four 
citations. Table 5 below lists the thirteen most frequently cited decisions of the 
Lamer Court (thirteen because of the two-way tie for twelfth place). 
The much lower citation count for the Lamer Court is striking: The most 
frequently cited decision of the Lamer Court would not displace the twelfth most 
cited decision of the Dickson Court. I think the major explanation for this is the 
obvious one, which is that the Dickson Court was delivering the “first generation” 
of major Charter decisions, as that addition to our constitution worked itself into 
the legal fabric of the country. (All of the top dozen Dickson Court decisions are 
Charter cases). There is another contributing explanation: The Dickson Court 
decisions by definition had another decade to accumulate citations, but—as I 
will explain in Part IV(C), below—the attrition rate for citation frequency makes 
this a smaller factor than one might expect. In any event, since the comparisons 
in terms of citation count are being made within rather than between chief 
justiceships, this does not compromise the present enquiry. 
TABLE 5: MOST FREQUENTLY CITED DECISIONS OF THE LAMER COURT
Case Citation Delivered by: Actual Cites
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp [1994] 3 SCR 835 Lamer CJ 89
R v Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 McLachlin 78
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re) [1998] 1 SCR 27 Iacobucci 74
MCCORMICK, GENDER AND JUDGMENT ASSIGNMENT 611
R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326 Sopinka 61
R v O’Connor [1995] 4 SCR 411 L’Heureux-Dubé 60
Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679 Lamer CJ 60
RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199 McLachlin 59
Baker v Canada [1999] 2 SCR 817 L’Heureux-Dubé 52
Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 Iacobucci 52
Canada v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 Iacobucci 49
Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 La Forest 49
Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 Cory & Iacobucci 47
R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452 Sopinka 47
 
Table 5 identifies the most frequently cited decisions of the Lamer Court 
(thirteen decisions are listed because of a two-way tie for twelfth place). The 
authors of the most frequently cited decisions are a more diverse group than 
was the case for the corresponding set of major cases from the Dickson Court. 
Only Justice Iacobucci appears on the list for more than a pair of cases. No fewer 
than five judges have at least two decisions in this top thirteen (and five different 
judges author the top five decisions35), and two of those five (Justices McLachlin 
and L’Heureux-Dubé) are female judges. While Chief Justice Dickson and Justice 
Lamer (as he then was) dominated the top cases list in the Dickson Court, the 
Lamer Court differs: There is no comparable dominant pair or trio.
Recalculating on the reduced set of sixty-eight decisions (further reduced to 
sixty-seven because one of them—the Secession Reference—was a By the Court 
decision) generates the figures in the right-hand columns of Table 4. Once again, 
three judges (Justices Cory and Iacobucci, and Chief Justice Lamer) combine 
for exactly half of the top tenth of the most frequently cited decisions, although 
the appearance of a dramatic separation between the top handful and the others 
is rather less in evidence than was the case for the Dickson Court. As with the 
35. The tie is thus broken between R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411, 130 DLR (4th) 235, and 
Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1, in favor of the former, on the 
grounds that it had three fewer years to accumulate the sixty citations.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL612
previous Part, I use the data in Table 4 to accumulate separate counts for the male 
and female judges, and this is shown in Table 6.












All judges 83.47 655 7.85 67 0.80
Male judges 63.61 526.5 8.28 53 0.83
Female judges 19.86 128.5 6.47[78.2%] 14
0.70
[84.6%]
The initial indications were promising, to the extent of suggesting a possible 
refutation of the Songer thesis: female judges authored four of the thirteen most 
frequently cited decisions (two by Justice McLachlin, as she then was, and two 
by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé). This is just under one third of the major cases, 
although female judges accounted for less than one quarter of the total years of 
service. However, this is not sustained by the wider count. On a per judge per 
year basis, female judges delivered less than 80 per cent as many decisions in 
total, and less than 85 per cent as many of the major decisions. In one important 
respect, this reverses a pattern from the Dickson Court, where female judges 
delivered more than their notional share of total judgments but less than their 
notional share of major judgments. On the Lamer Court, female judges’ share of 
major judgments is slightly higher than their share of total judgments. Signifi-
cantly, the “per judge per year” factor for women narrows the gap with their male 
colleagues: below 75 per cent in the Dickson Court, it is slightly under 85 per 
cent in the Lamer Court. But to make the obvious point, it is still lower than for 
male judges, and this disparity is all the more striking for the fact that it persists 
over two chief justiceships totaling more than fifteen years and including four 
different female judges with a combined total of thirty years of service.
Once again, on the Lamer Court as on the Dickson Court, female judges 
were more likely to be writing or joining minority reasons. Male judges wrote or 
joined minority reasons in less than one-fifth of all their panel appearances (up 
from about one-sixth for the Dickson Court), whereas female judges did so in just 
under one-third of theirs (up from one-quarter for the Dickson Court). To put 
it differently, female judges were only 80 per cent as likely as their male counter-
parts to join the judgment-delivering majority on a Court panel, which makes 
it less surprising that they were only 85 per cent as likely to deliver the reasons 
for judgment. In Slotnick’s terms, female judges still seemed to suffer from the 
single penalty of not being as frequently on-side with the majority (although on 
the Lamer Court, unlike the Dickson Court, there was no appearance that this 
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was off-set by skewed assignments overall), but not the double penalty of also 
being pushed back further in the queue for dissenting more often. If the “first 
look” explanation of the figures from the Dickson Court is that women received 
their share of total cases but less than their share of major cases for the delivery of 
majority reasons, the corresponding “first look” explanation of the figures for the 
Lamer Court is that female judges paid the price for their more frequent partici-
pation in dissents and separate concurrences.36
C. THE MCLACHLIN COURT
An obvious initial problem needs to be overcome before this article can proceed 
to an analysis of the McLachlin Court that parallels those of the preceding two 
chief justiceships. That problem is that the McLachlin Court is, first, much more 
recent, and second, still ongoing. Recency suggests that none of the decisions 
have had enough time to accumulate the full citation count that would rank them 
appropriately. The fact that the Court is still ongoing means that this ranking 
challenge applies very unevenly across the decade-plus, in that the early decisions 
have had up to a dozen years to be cited while the more recent decisions have had 
only weeks or months. I think that this problem is at least partially solvable (for 
eleven years of decisions, if not for the full thirteen), and I will explain why and 
how in this Part.
Between 7 January 2000 and 31 December 2012, the McLachlin Court 
made 11,471 citations to previous decisions of the Court. For each of those 
citations, I have calculated the “age” of the cited case at the time of citation—i.e., 
the date of decision delivery subtracted from the date of its subsequent citation—
and then counted the number of citations for the first year after decision delivery, 
and the second year, and so on. There were 795 citations to cases handed down 
less than a year previously, 590 citations to cases more than one but less than two 
years old, 553 citations to cases more than two but less than three years old, and 
so on down to the thirteen that were more than thirty-nine but less than forty 
years old. This count is displayed below, in Figure 1, in the slightly jagged line.
36. Of course, the arrow of causation could just as likely be running the other way. It could be 
that the reason that female judges dissented or separately concurred more often is that they 
were being excluded from their notional share of the judgments, especially the significant 
judgments, and the alternative to writing minority reasons was silence.
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FIGURE 1: AGE OF CITATIONS AT TIME OF CITATION: MCLACHLIN COURT 
[2000–12]
This pattern is far from a random walk; it shows a continuous decline, a 
strong tendency for cases to be cited less often as they get older. The line is 
not straight but curved. As a result, it must be possible (using a “least sum of 
squares”37 test) to identify the line that best matches the actual numbers. This is 
shown by the second (smooth) line on Figure 1, which reflects a steady 6.5 per 
cent depreciation rate from the initial value of 795. On the empirical evidence of 
the first thirteen years of the McLachlin Court, its use of “older” cases decays by 
a constant 6.5 per cent, such that five-year-old cases are cited only 93.5 per cent 
as often as four-year-old cases, and ten-year-old cases are cited only 93.5 per cent 
as often as nine-year-old cases, and so on.38 
37. The “least sum of squares” test can be explained as follows: A set of data points in the real 
world is always slightly scattered, so the actual line is a wiggly mess. The aim is to find 
the formula-generated line that best represents these points. From observation, one can 
see that the line in question is not a straight line but looks more like a standard decay 
curve. A possible equation looks at the line (i.e., the series of predicted data points) that 
would represent a constant decay of X per cent from the starting point, such that point 1 
is “starting point times (1-X),” point 2 is “starting point times (1-X) squared,” and point 3 
is “starting point times (1-X) cubed,” and so on for as many data points as may have been 
accumulated. The fit is measured by calculating the value of “predicted point 1 - actual point 
1” and squaring it. We do the same for “predicted point 2 - actual point 2,” and so on for 
all the data points. We calculate the total value of all the squares of these differences, which 
winds up being a rather large number that has no meaning in itself except as a comparison 
point. Subsequently, we repeat the process for a different value of X, then for a third, then 
for a fourth, adjusting that value continuously to generate the smallest possible total sum 
of squares. This line is now the best fit to the actual set of data points, an objectively and 
demonstrably better answer to “what equation can be used to generate this line?” than any 
possible alternative value for X. The decay rate that I indicate is the result of this process 
applied to the “actual count” numbers in Figure 1.
38. See Peter McCormick, “What Supreme Court Cases Does the Supreme Court Cite?: 
Follow-Up Citations on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993” (1996) 7 Sup Ct L Rev 
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This comment about the Court is generally true of judicial citation 
practices—an idea first suggested by William M. Landes and Posner almost forty 
years ago.39 Much more recently, Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II (speaking 
of the USSC) describe as “a well-established empirical regularity” the idea “that 
Supreme Court precedents experience depreciation, whereby cases are generally 
less likely to be cited as they become older.”40 Constant and mathematically 
precise reductions in citation frequency are a general feature of judicial citation.
If this is the case, we must be able simply to turn the figure around, and 
use it to predict citation frequencies for the cases that the McLachlin Court 
itself is handing down, and whose citation frequency patterns will follow the 
same dynamic at the hands of the McLachlin Court and its successors. Looking 
backward, the line reports the impact of recency on citation frequency. Looking 
forward (and turning the y-axis into percentages rather than hard numbers), it 
projects over time the number of citations per year for any case or set of cases. 
Under the same logic, the area under the curve is the total number of citations 
that will have been accumulated after any selected number of years. If we know 
how many times a case has been cited in, say, five years—in other words, if we 
know the area under the curve for that part of the graph—then we can project 
a count of how often it will be cited in ten years, or twenty, or fifty, and so on.41 
For present purposes, I will limit myself to using the first thirteen years of 
the McLachlin Court to accumulate citations, but only using cases from the first 
eleven years to drive an analysis that parallels that of the earlier courts (i.e., I will 
not be making any projections based on less than two full years of citation, and 
most projections will of course draw on a longer citation accumulation period). 
Nor will I extend my reach anywhere near fifty years, but only far enough to 
equalize the time period involved so that each case enjoys the citation count 
that my model predicts for a complete thirteen years. Using this methodology, 
the decisions of the McLachlin Court that will be cited the most frequently are 
shown in Table 7.
(2d) 451 (providing an earlier explanation and application of this methodology). See also 
Peter McCormick, The End of the Charter Revolution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 
ch 8 [forthcoming in 2014] (making a more ambitious application, differentiating a series of 
chief justiceships).
39. See “Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis” (1976) 19:2 JL & Econ 249.
40. “The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent” (2013) 10:2 J Empirical 
Legal Stud 325 at 329.
41. Obviously, the counts will more precisely serve this purpose if the time periods over which 
citation has accumulated are done in terms of months rather than years. This is what has 
been used for the calculations described in the rest of this Part.
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TABLE 7: MOST FREQUENTLY CITED DECISIONS (ACTUAL AND PROJECTED) 
FOR THE MCLACHLIN COURT
Case Citation Delivered by: Actual Cites
Projected 
Cites
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9 Bastarache & LeBel 34 70
R v Grant 2009 SCC 32 McLachlin CJ & Charron 24 65
Housen v Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33 Iacobucci & Major 51 57
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership 
v Rex 2002 SCC 42 Iacobucci 50 56
R v Sharpe 2001 SCC 2 McLachlin CJ 44 49
Canada v Khosa 2009 SCC 12 Binnie 16 40
Toronto (City) v Canadian Union 
of Public Employees (CUPE), 
Local 79
2003 SCC 63 Arbour 26 33
Suresh v Canada 2002 SCC 1 By the Court 29 32
R v Malmo-Levine 2003 SCC 74 Gonthier & Binnie 25 32
Dr Q v College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of British Columbia 2003 SCC 19 McLachlin CJ 26 31
Law Society of New Brunswick v 
Ryan 2003 SCC 20 Iacobucci 25 30
United States of America v Burns 2001 SCC 7 By the Court 19 29
Canadian Western Bank v Alberta 2007 SCC 22 Binnie & LeBel 16 29
These citation counts might seem low, but remember that they only account 
for eleven years of actual or projected citations on an unusually flat deprecia-
tion curve (the decay rate for citations by the Lamer Court was twice as steep). 
On this projection methodology, the life-time accumulated citations of the 
top two cases on the list, and possibly the top four, will eventually exceed one 
hundred, something that has been done to date by less than a dozen decisions 
of the Court. The judgment delivery pattern of the top thirteen (again, because 
of a tie for twelfth spot) is rather different from that of the previous Courts. For 
one thing, there are more co-authored judgments (by three different pairs of 
judges). For another, the list includes a pair of By the Court judgments, where 
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there were none in the two previous Courts’ lists. Chief Justice McLachlin’s three 
sole-authored judgments lead the table. Justices Iacobucci and Binnie appear just 
as often, but only by virtue of co-authorship. Chief Justice McLachlin aside, 
female judges are not much in evidence, with Justice Arbour’s single decision being 
the only exception.
Against this methodological background, we can generate the data that 
parallel Table 1 for the Dickson Court and Table 4 for the Lamer Court for 
eleven (not thirteen) years of cases for the McLachlin Court. This restriction 
to eleven years also explains why Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and Wagner 
do not show up on the list: Table 8 presents the data for the fifteen judges who 
served on the McLachlin Court as of 31 December 2010.  














Iacobucci 4.48 42 9.4 9.5 2.12 329%
McLachlin CJ 10.98 85.5 7.8 14 1.28 198%
Arbour 4.48 28.5 6.4 3.5 0.78 121%
Binnie 10.98 78 7.1 8 0.73 113%
Gonthier 3.56 18.5 5.2 2.5 0.7 109%
Bastarache 8.48 52.5 6.2 5.5 0.65 101%
Abella 6.34 31.5 5.0 4 0.63 98%
LeBel 10.98 79.5 7.2 5.5 0.5 78%
Charron 6.34 46 7.3 3 0.47 73%
Major 5.97 48.5 8.1 2.5 0.42 65%
L’Heureux-Dubé 2.48 3 1.2 1 0.40 63%
Deschamps 8.40 35 4.2 2 0.24 37%
Rothstein 4.84 31.5 6.5 1 0.21 32%
Fish 7.41 39.5 5.3 1 0.13 21%
Cromwell 2.02 8.5 4.2 0
By the Court 35 2
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Once again, jointly authored reasons (a total of sixty-two) have studded the 
table with fractions, although this time there were no triple-authored decisions. 
Co-authorship of judgments, and of minority reasons as well, is emerging as 
a modest but persistent portion of the McLachlin Court’s output. If separate 
concurrences were the identifying mark of the Lamer Court, co-authorships are 
becoming the identifying mark for the decisions of the McLachlin Court. The 
overall average number of decisions per judge per year (excluding the 35 By the 
Court decisions) was lower again at 6.4, down from 8.3 for the Dickson Court, 
and 7.85 for the Lamer Court. Chief Justice McLachlin, and Justices Binnie 
and LeBel lead in total judgments delivered; for the top tenth decisions, Justice 
Iacobucci displaces Justice LeBel. It is still the case that three judges account for 
nearly half of the important decisions (Chief Justice McLachlin, and Justices 
Iacobucci and Binnie total 31.5 out of the 64 cases in the top tenth once the 2 By 
the Court cases are removed). 
In overall judgments, women trail their male colleagues by almost a full 
judgment per year, even though the male/female difference in participation in 
minority reasons has completely vanished—both write or join minority reasons 
about 14 per cent of the time. But the difference flips the other way for the 
more frequently cited decisions, and for the first time the female judges are not 
just ahead, but substantially ahead of their colleagues, enjoying a 13 per cent 
advantage.












All judges 97.74 628 6.43 63 0.64
Male judges 58.72 398.5 6.79 36 0.61




It would seem, then, that this story has come full circle, with female justices 
initially disadvantaged in the delivery of important decisions on the Dickson 
Court, closing the gap on the Lamer Court, and finally pulling ahead on the 
McLachlin Court. In terms of women coming to the table and taking a share of 
what really matters, as I described the challenge in the introduction, this seems 
to be the happiest of endings. But there is one further aspect of the matter that 
needs to be taken into consideration before drawing this conclusion, and that is 
what we might call the “Chief Justice factor.”
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V. THE CHIEF JUSTICE FACTOR
As we saw in the previous Part, more important judgments of the Dickson and 
Lamer Courts were delivered per judge per year by male judges (one of whom was 
the Chief Justice) than by the female justices, whereas more important judgments 
of the McLachlin court were delivered per judge per year by female judges (one of 
whom was the Chief Justice) than by their male colleagues. Before we conclude 
that the wheel has turned and equal sharing has been achieved, perhaps even 
exceeded, we should look more closely at the reiterated parenthetical comment 
in the preceding sentence and ask how much difference it makes that one justice 
is also the Chief Justice. Is there a Chief Justice factor at work in addition to a 
gender factor?
Even on the face of the standard descriptions of the judgment assignment 
process, there is some reason to look for such a factor. If two or more judges 
volunteer to deliver the judgment, it goes to the senior justice—and the Chief 
Justice is by definition always the senior justice. (For almost all of the last thirty 
years, the Chief Justice has also been the longest serving member of the Court, 
so they would win the ties even without this proviso.) Beyond this, however, it 
seems reasonable to think that there is an expectation that the Chief Justice will 
visibly lead the Court by delivering at least a mildly disproportionate share of the 
highest profile and most controversial decisions, a category that is not identical 
to but can reasonably be taken as strongly overlapping with my “most frequently 
cited” criterion.
As the numbers in Part IV showed, Chief Justices have not always led the 
Court in top tenth judgments per year, but they have always been part of the 
cluster at the top of the ranking—always one of the handful of judges visibly 
leading the Court in the cases that cast real shadows. Table 10 isolates the Chief 
Justices’ numbers from those of the other members of the Court and expresses 
each Chief Justice’s top tenth judgments per year as a ratio of the other justices’ 
top tenth judgments per year. That Chief Justice Dickson would have led 
his Court so strongly, delivering something more than a double share of the 
major decisions, is perhaps not surprising, and the Chief Justice factor is only 
slightly less dramatic for Chief Justice Lamer. However, despite her reputation 
for keeping a lower profile on a more collegial Court, Chief Justice McLachlin 
dominates her Court on the more important cases every bit as much as did Chief 
Justice Dickson. The lower numbers for judgments per year for the Lamer Court 
and especially for the McLachlin Court reflect the declining reserved judgment 
caseload for the more recent Courts. 
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Dickson CJ 6.20 10.83 1.75 227%
All other members of the Dickson 
Court 48.48 37.17 0.77
Lamer CJ 9.52 12 1.26 170%
All other members of the Lamer 
Court 73.95 55 0.74
McLachlin CJ 10.98 14 1.28 226%
All other members of the 
McLachlin Court 86.76 49 0.56
But if there is a Chief Justice factor, the relative judgment delivery rates 
that test the Songer hypothesis should be based strictly on comparisons between 
puisne justice apples, leaving out the Chief Justice oranges. This corrected 
comparison, presented in Table 11, has a substantial impact across all three chief 
justiceships. On this measure, female judges are still slightly disadvantaged on the 
Dickson Court, but the margin of this disadvantage has shrunk from 25 per cent 
to 13 per cent. On the Lamer Court, this margin is similarly reduced, from 15 
per cent to a relatively modest 7 per cent—that is to say, the Chief Justice factor 
itself accounts for fully one half of the apparent disadvantage of female justices 
in important judgment assignments for the first fifteen years for which female 
judges accumulated significant service on the Court.
On the McLachlin Court, however, removing the Chief Justice from the 
count not only turns the apparent positive advantage for female judges back into 
the same kind of disadvantage they have experienced in the past, but also suggests 
that the margin of this disadvantage is larger than it has ever been. This is despite 
the fact that the ratio in total years of service, although still tipped strongly 
towards male judges, is significantly less so on the McLachlin Court than ever 
before. Furthermore, the McLachlin Court includes a larger number of female 
judges, a fact that makes an idiosyncratic or personality-driven explanation less 
plausible. The McLachlin Court has had more female puisne justices than ever 
before, and they have accumulated a larger share of the total years of service than 
ever before. But so far there is no indication that they are getting proportionately 
more of the judgments. If anything, the contrary is true. 
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Dickson Court, male judges 37.82 29.83 0.79
Dickson Court, female 
judges 10.66 7.33 0.69 87.2%
Lamer Court, male judges 54.09 41 0.76
Lamer Court, female judges 19.86 14 0.70 93.0%
McLachlin Court, male 
judges 58.72 35.5 0.60
McLachlin Court, female 
judges 28.04 13.5 0.48 79.6%
VI. DOES IT MATTER?
It might be objected that these differences are, in the end, rather small. After 
all, one might say, just move one or two major decisions from the average male 
judge to the average female judge every year or so, and the apparent inequality 
is exorcised. Indeed, move three or four, and the apparent discrimination is 
reversed. What can be so significant about three or four decisions on a court that 
once handed down a hundred decisions a year, and even now delivers annually 
five or six dozen? 
This question grossly understates the problem. We are not talking about just 
three more decisions here or two fewer decisions there, but two or three for every 
single judge; the notional “average male judge” or “average female judge” both 
stand in for a much longer line of specific individuals. Nor are we talking about 
routine cases or even about normal decisions, but about the top tenth of the 
Court’s caseload, amounting to about eight cases per year for the Dickson Court, 
seven per year for the Lamer Court, and an even scarcer six per year for the 
McLachlin Court. There is nothing small or inconsequential about hypothetically 
shuffling one or more of these from one judge to another, because each top tenth 
case is a trophy that has been realized after surviving both the initial judgment 
assignment gauntlet and the possibility of losing the majority on a swing within 
the panel. For the individual judge, a puisne justice, this is an opportunity that 
does not come as often as once per year. Coming out behind by that notional 
fraction of a judgment per average judge per year is, over a number of years, the 
functional equivalent of being obliged to leave the Court early, of having a career 
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL622
cut short. Fewer decisions per year means having to invest more years to get the 
same return, and in this context, apparently small differences really matter. 
This difference can be quantified: On the Dickson Court, the average puisne 
justice delivered 0.77 major judgments per year. Since the average career for a 
Court justice since 1949 has been about thirteen years, this average number 
implies a total of ten such judgments over the normal career. To achieve this 
number would have taken the average male judge on that Court twelve years and 
eight months, the average female judge fourteen years and six months. On the 
Lamer Court, this number had fallen slightly to 9.6 major judgments over the 
normal career, still taking the average male judge the same twelve years and eight 
months but the average female judge thirteen years and nine months. On the 
McLachlin Court, the 0.56 major judgments per year for each judge other than 
the Chief Justice suggest a normal career total of only 7.25 judgments, which 
would take the average male judge twelve years and two months, but the average 
female judge fifteen years and two months. 
I do not think it is fanciful to describe a judicial career in terms of the major 
judgments delivered. I have had the opportunity to speak to four justices or 
former justices of the Court, and when I asked them which of their judgments 
would be remembered and cited the longest, they had not the slightest hesitation 
in coming up with two or three prime candidates.42 Judges contribute to many 
decisions through their participation on panels, through the circulate-and-revise 
process, and through their minority reasons, but they are generally remembered 
for the majority judgments that they delivered on behalf of the Court.
VII. CAVEATS FOR THIS STUDY
Of necessity, focussing the spotlight on any one thing involves leaving other 
things in the shadows, and in the immediate context there are several things 
located just off center stage that should not be ignored.
First, as emphasized from the beginning, citation frequency (even when it is 
adjusted by the decay curve to allow fair treatment of more recent decisions) is 
only one measure of decision importance, and by no means a perfect one. Were 
someone to suggest that a particular Court decision was important even though it 
was seldom cited, that suggestion would require some solid argument to support 
it, but it would not be ridiculous on its face.43 That said, to concede a possible 
42. Intriguingly, when I asked them what set of reasons they were most proud of, they typically 
suggested a dissent.
43. At one time, I tried to persuade a former dean of a central Canadian law school to lend his 
name and letterhead to a major survey of legal professionals asking them to identify the 
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set of “important but seldom cited” cases, and possibly an additional (somewhat 
less credible) offsetting set of “unimportant even though frequently cited” cases, 
would compromise my analysis only should there be some systematic connection 
between the gender of the judge and either set of cases, which seems unlikely.
Second, my cut-off point of the top ten per cent (i.e., top tenth) is both 
arbitrary and restrictive, and a more generous criterion (e.g., top 25 per cent) 
might yield a rather different result. An earlier version of this article attempted 
a “top quarter” to go along with the top tenth as two parallel strands of analysis, 
but commentators found it ponderous and awkward. The narrow focus, 
though, seems justified; it is entirely reasonable to suggest that, on average, the 
Court hands down a half dozen or so decisions every year that stand out for 
their enduring significance, and that it is worth keeping track of which judges 
dominate judgment delivery for this top fraction. This is all the more so because 
the drop-off in citation frequencies is so pronounced—only staying with top 
tenth ensures a list of cases whose subsequent citation counts measure in the 
dozens.44 Since my method already implies that the most frequently cited case 
and the one at the very bottom of the top 10 per cent are both in some sense 
equal for my purposes, I am reluctant to water the wine any further.
Third, my measure of the jurisprudential contribution of the various judges 
is based on the delivery of the reasons for judgment in frequently cited decisions, 
but the other judges who sign on to the judgment of the Court also play a part 
in the drafting of reasons through a circulation-and-revision process that, on all 
indications, is taken very seriously. Writing the reasons yourself might be the best 
way to ensure that your favoured ideas appear within the reasons for judgment, 
but it is not the only way. For that matter, writing minority reasons can be more 
influential than some might think; at one point during the early Lamer Court, 
about one citation in every nine that the Court made to its own prior decisions 
was to minority reasons.45 For the current McLachlin Court, that frequency is 
down by half. Justice Wilson’s frequently cited (and quoted) separate concurrence 
in R v Morgentaler46 is the most striking, but far from the only, example.
Court’s most important decisions, mirroring similar studies in the United States, but he 
declined. Such a second angle on decision importance would be useful, although I suspect 
it would largely overlap with the citation frequency set, creating a Venn diagram with a very 
large centre and two small, albeit interesting, wings.    
44. For the same reason, I work with top tenth for the chief justiceship rather than the top tenth 
for each separate year, because, like Biblical Pharaonic Egypt, the Court clearly has “fat” years 
and “lean” years in terms of how memorable its delivered decisions are.
45. See Peter McCormick, “Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents & Separate 
Concurrences, 1949-1996” (2002) 81:2 Can Bar Rev 369.
46. [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385.
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Fourth, in this study, judgment delivery rates are expressed on a “per year of 
service” basis. They could equally have been computed “per panel appearance”—
judge-by-judge variations in this respect are not significant so the results would 
not change,47 although the “per year” figure communicates the differences in a 
less abstract way. The advantage of working from panel appearances is that this 
number could—where the “per year” number could not—be adjusted for those 
panel appearances that result in the writing or joining of minority reasons, thus 
implying a reduced availability for the judgment assignment.
The methodological problem here is that the “per year” approach assumes 
that splits in the panel always come before the assignment; but what about the 
possibility that the splits come later, that some decisions to write or to join 
minority reasons come after the judgment assignment? This may happen because 
of details or choices within the majority reasons as they are drafted, or it may be 
that being passed over for majority reasons (especially if it happens repeatedly) 
may itself contribute to the decision to write minority reasons.48 I strongly suspect 
that most splits emerge at the post-hearing conference, but I also suspect that 
the circulate-and-revise process is sufficiently real and engaged that a non-trivial 
proportion emerge later in the process. If an attempt to persuade and/or negotiate 
from within the majority block is not sufficiently successful, minority reasons 
may be the consequence. Working from panel appearances, and adjusting that 
for minority reason participation, may “over-exclude” for these late-emerging 
fragmentations and simultaneously “over-include” for initial panel divisions that 
are overcome by the majority’s persuasive drafting and effective responses.
Fifth, and rather more seriously, the numbers for the participation of 
female judges, especially on the earlier Courts, are dominated by a small set of 
judges: Justices Wilson, L’Heureux-Dubé, and McLachlin. As a result, it is hard 
to distinguish between a systematic institutional product on the one hand and 
the play of unique personality effects on the other. In addition, the smaller the 
47. C L Ostberg, Matthew E Wetstein, and Craig R Ducat suggest that first-year justices are 
assigned fewer panels, but this is a short-term effect, matched by a comparable drop-off in 
panel appearances after the eighth or ninth year. See “Acclimation Effects on the Supreme 
Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore” (2003) 84:3 Soc Sci Q 
704 at 713-15.  My own figures on “reserved panel appearances per hundred days of service” 
show some judge-to-judge variation, but nothing systemic, and never to the extent that the 
accumulated numbers for female judges and male judges are not within a plus or minus 2 per 
cent range.
48. Years ago, Slotnick suggested a kind of vicious circle: Judges who frequently write minority 
reasons may pay an implicit tax for this individualism by getting less than their notional 
share of the judgments, even when they do join the majority. Supra note 34.
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number of judges involved, the larger the possibility and the potential magnitude 
of such distortion. These three judges combined account for more than 60 per 
cent of the person-years of judicial service accumulated by all female judges up 
to the end of 2011. Chief Justice McLachlin alone accounts for almost one third 
of the total, divided evenly between her service as a puisne judge and as Chief 
Justice, and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé for a fifth of the total.
Sixth, the women other than these three have either served for relatively short 
terms (Justice Arbour) or have been appointed fairly recently—within the period 
considered in this article, only Justice Deschamps had more than eight years of 
service, and only Justices Abella and Charron joined her with more than six. 
But seniority is one of the factors mentioned in the standard accounts of Court 
decision making as an element in the assignment of the majority judgment. To 
be sure, it is only one element among several, and it is not described in a way 
that allows any assessment of its relative weight; but to the extent that it drives 
the process at all, the seniority element would clearly work against female judges 
as a group and tilt the count towards their male colleagues. The next decade will 
provide a good test in this regard: When Chief Justice McLachlin retires from the 
Court in 2018 (assuming she serves until the age of seventy-five), she will leave an 
unusually junior Court of which only a single member will have more than ten 
years of experience, and that person (Justice Abella) will be a woman.49
These are grains of salt with which the general findings must be taken, 
and they suggest that these findings should be treated as indicative rather than 
definitive, suggestive rather than conclusive. But unless all cut heavily the same 
way, with citability, personality, and seniority all having the maximum likely 
impact and in the same direction, they will at most qualify rather than refute the 
general suggestion that female judges have yet to achieve full participation in the 
Court’s most important activities. 
49. The most obvious way to talk about seniority is of course “years of service”—a senior 
judge is one who has served on the Court for (say) ten years. But in terms of judgment 
assignment, this is not the operational definition, because the real question is how many 
judges are more senior, and this is highly variable. After six full years of service, Justice La 
Forest (appointed in 1985) was the third most senior on the Court; after an identical six 
years, Justice Chouinard (appointed in 1979) was the fifth most senior; but after the same 
length of service, Justice Iacobucci (appointed in 1991) was still only the eighth most senior. 
The generalization “the longer you serve, the more senior you become” is only true if it is 
understood in a way that is not too mechanical or automatic.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have looked at the assignment of reasons for judgment on the 
Court over the last three chief justiceships, with specific reference to the relative 
rate of assignments to male and female judges.
I have tried to distinguish between the total run of decisions and the more 
important ones—the top tenth—by using the criterion of subsequent citation 
by the Court itself. This is not a perfect differentiator, but it is both credible 
and objective, and it picks up on what is certainly one of the major identifiers of 
enduring significance. I have used this criterion even for the ongoing McLachlin 
chief justiceship by drawing on a broader theory of judicial citation that posits a 
constant decay rate in citation frequency.
Having identified a lower rate of participation on major decisions for female 
judges on both the Dickson and Lamer Courts, I noted an apparent reversal of 
this pattern under Chief Justice McLachlin. However, I then explored a Chief 
Justice factor in judgment assignment, on the not unlikely hypothesis that for 
institutional reasons Chief Justices deliver more than their notional one-ninth 
share of judgments, especially for the more important decisions. Adjusting for 
this factor (i.e., recalculating with the Chief Justices removed from the mix) not 
only restored the male/female gap, but suggested that it is more robust than ever.
The persistence of this pattern over three chief justiceships—the third Chief 
Justice a woman—suggests that there is more to this than the casual byplay of 
idiosyncratic personalities; something that may be structural and enduring, 
although I have identified other considerations that suggest that there may be 
factors at play other than gender alone.
To return to my opening question: Now that women are receiving an 
increasing share of the seats on the Court, can we conclude with confidence 
that they have been admitted to full participation, with a mix of judgments—
including the more significant decisions—that is fully comparable to their male 
colleagues? I would have to suggest that the answer is no.
